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The Decriminalisation of Abortion: An
Argument for Modernisation
Sally Sheldon*
Abstract—While abortion is now offered as a routine part of modern NHS-funded
reproductive healthcare, the legal framework regulating it remains rooted in the
punitive, conservative values of the mid-Victorian era. This article argues that this
framework is in need of fundamental reform to modernise it in line with the clinical
science and moral values of the 21st century. It assesses the current statutory
framework regulating abortion against the purposes that are typically claimed to
motivate it: the protection of women; and the prevention and condemnation of the
intentional destruction of fetal life. It argues that it fails to achieve either of these
broad aims and that we should thus remove specific criminal penalties relating to
abortion. This, it is suggested, would be likely to have very limited impact on the
incidence of abortion but would, however, better recognise contemporary medical
realities and moral thinking.
Keywords: Abortion Act 1967, Offences Against the Person Act 1861, abortion
law, unlawful procurement of miscarriage, decriminalisation
1. Introduction
Abortion is a criminal offence in England, Wales and Northern Ireland by
virtue of a statute passed at a time when ‘our society was only on the brink of
the beginnings of the modern world’.1 The Offences Against the Person Act
1861 (OAPA) was passed in the middle of the reign of Queen Victoria, some
20 years before married women were recognised as legal persons able to own
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property in their own right, almost 70 years before the achievement of women’s
right to vote on equal terms with men,2 and at a time that ‘in matters sexual
was almost unimaginably different from ours’.3 As such, it is unsurprising that
the Law Commission has recognised that the OAPA is severely outdated and is
consulting on how it might be modernised.4 While far reaching in its extent,
however, this consultation explicitly excludes offences relating to abortion on
the basis that they ‘are not included in the 1998 draft Bill or previous Law
Commission projects on offences against the person, and raise issues going well
beyond the law of offences against the person’.5 While this is true, the refusal
of successive governments to update the law governing abortion leaves intact
an archaic legal framework that suffers from many of exactly the same
problems that the Commission sees as providing a compelling case for general
reform of the OAPA. Moreover, while the harshest punitive effects of the
OAPA were mitigated by the therapeutic exception carved out by Abortion Act
1967, that too is now a badly outdated piece of law, with multiple inadequacies
rendered ever more apparent in the face of evolutions in clinical practice. This
article argues that this legal framework is now in need of fundamental reform
to modernise it in line with the clinical science and moral values of the 21st
century.
Moral consensus in this area is notoriously elusive and I do not aim to
contribute to the very extensive literature regarding the ethics of abortion.6
However, even within this polarised debate, typically dominated by vocal
minorities, it seems to me that the following broad principles that provide the
premises for my argument are capable of commanding widespread support in the
British context. First, women should be enabled fully to participate in the public
sphere on equal terms with men and, prima facie, control of one’s own fertility is
a fundamental prerequisite for such full participation.7 Second, states have an
important responsibility to support and promote the health, including the
2 Some women gained the vote via the Representation of the People Act 1918, with full female franchise
achieved in the Equal Franchise Act 1928. The Married Women’s Property Act 1882 changed the law to permit
married women to own, buy and sell property in their own right.
3 Smeaton (n 1) [332] Munby J.
4 The Commissions Act 1965, s 3, sets out the Law Commission’s duty with regard to ‘the elimination of
anomalies, the repeal of obsolete and unnecessary enactments, the reduction of the number of separate
enactments and generally the simplification and modernisation of the law’. In its own words, the Commission is
charged to ensure that the law is fair, modern, simple and effective, see Law Commission, <www.lawcom.gov.
uk> (accessed 11 August 2015).
5 Law Commission, Reform of Offences Against the Person: A Scoping Consultation Paper (Law Com, CP No 217,
2014) 54. The draft Bill referenced here was published as part of an earlier Consultation exercise, entitled
Violence: Reforming the Offences against the Person Act 1861.
6 For a very small taste of the voluminous literature, see J Finnis and others, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion
(Philosophy & Public Affairs Readers 1974); R Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument about Abortion and
Euthanasia (HarperCollins 1993); RP Petchesky, Abortion and Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and
Reproductive Freedom (Longman 1984); and J Harris, The Value Of Life (Routledge 1985).
7 R Siegel, ‘Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional
Expression’ (2006–07) 56 Emory LJ 815.











reproductive health, of their citizens.8 Third, while its application in the abortion
context is controversial, few would deny the importance of the general principle
of respect for patient autonomy in medical practice.9 In principle, this raises a
strong argument in favour of supporting women to make their own, informed
medical decisions about a pregnancy, unless there is very good reason to refuse
this right.10 Fourth, it flows from this that there should be robust provision for
informed consent before an abortion, with measures to ensure that that the
woman’s decision is voluntary; that full, accurate, evidence-based information is
given about all the options open to her; and that sufficient time is allowed for her
to make a decision. Fifth, while not a full moral person with equal ethical status
to someone who has been born, the human fetus is of moral value and holds a
significance that increases as it grows throughout pregnancy.11 Sixth, both for this
reason and because of the greater risks to the woman at later gestations, other
things being equal, it is better for abortions to take place early in pregnancy.
Seventh, where abortions are performed, they should be done in accordance with
the best available standards of medical practice. Eighth, debate with regard to law
reform should be honest: religious values should be weighed as matters of
religion, ethical issues should be debated as matters of ethics, and medical claims
should be evidenced through a robust scientific base, with no toleration of
political ideology masquerading as scientific fact. And, finally, the criminal law,
which involves the most onerous and draconian of state powers, should be
invoked only where it provides a necessary and proportionate response.12
In this article, I suggest that taking these principles seriously requires
fundamental, root and branch legal reform, serving to decriminalise abortion
(which I take to mean the removal of specific criminal prohibitions relating to
abortion, without intending that it should be taken out of the ambit of any
8 Reproductive health is recognised as a basic right by the World Health Organisation, which understands it to
include the right ‘to be informed of and to have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of
fertility regulation’. WHO, ‘Reproductive Health’ <www.who.int/topics/reproductive_health/en/> (accessed 11
August 2015).
9 This received a clear judicial articulation in the case of Re T (Adult) [1992] 4 All ER 649 (CA) and, more
recently, in the Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire Health Board [2015] UKSC 11, [2014] 2
All ER 1031. The latter is further discussed below.
10 Even Foster, in a sustained critique of what he sees as undue weight given to autonomy in modern medical
ethics and law, does not deny that it has a vital role: C Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of
Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law (Hart 2009).
11 Neither is the fetus a legal person until it is born alive and separate from the body of its mother, Rance v
Mid-Downs Health Authority [1991] 1 QB 587 (QB). I make no attempt to convince those who object to abortion
on the basis of what Dworkin calls the ‘Derivative Objection’: that the fetus is a creature with interests of its own
right from the start, including an interest in remaining alive, and that it therefore has the rights that all humans
have. As Dworkin suggests, however, moral objections to abortion are, for most, not grounded in this view but
rather stem from what he calls the ‘Detached Objection’: that human life has intrinsic innate value and is sacred
in itself, detached from any particular rights or interests: Dworkin (n 6). This final empirical claim appears to be
borne out by the polling data discussed at nn 100 and 113–16 and accompanying text.
12 See eg, N Jareborg, ‘Criminalization as Last Resort’ (2005) 2 Ohio St J Crim L 512; A Ashworth,
‘Conceptions of Overcriminalization’ (2008) 5 Ohio St J Crim L 407; D Husak, Overcriminalisation: The Limits of
the Criminal Law (OUP 2008); and H Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction (Stanford University Press
1968).











general criminal law offences that apply to medical practice).13 The guiding
principle of such reform would be that where self-induced or requested by the
pregnant woman, the destruction of an embryo or fetus would no longer form
an independent ground for criminal sanction. This would not, of course, leave
abortion in a legal vacuum. Rather, it would be treated as any other area of
medical practice, remaining subject to the same range of criminal, civil,
administrative and disciplinary regulations that apply to all clinical procedures.
Specifically, this should mean that criminal sanction remains available where
terminations involve a serious harm to the woman concerned, most obviously,
where they are non-consensual.
My argument has three parts. First, I set out the relevant law, demonstrating
that it is grounded in the medical and social realities of another era and briefly
outlining some of the unjustifiable restrictions that it imposes on contemporary
clinical practice. These unwarranted limitations, along with the stigmatising
impact of criminal sanctions,14 give cause to reject any suggestion that reform
is unnecessary because abortion providers ‘can work around’ existing
deficiencies in the law.15 Second, and more fundamentally, I suggest that the
OAPA reflects modern moral values as poorly as it reflects modern medical
science. I consider the broad historical purposes that are said to underpin the
law, arguing that, as currently enforced, our legal framework plays no useful
role in fulfilling them in practice. I finish by discussing briefly what
decriminalisation would mean in the UK.
2. Current Law
The law governing abortion provides the oldest extant statutory framework
governing any specific medical procedure in the UK.16
A. The Offences Against the Person Act 1861
First, the OAPA applies in England, Wales and Northern Ireland (but not in
Scotland, where abortion remains an offence at common law). It contains three
offences that are relevant to the prosecution of abortions:
s 58 Every woman being with child, who, with intent to procure her own
miscarriage shall unlawfully administer to herself any poison or other noxious thing,
13 The applicability of such offences in the context of abortion is briefly explored in section 3.
14 R Cook, ‘Stigmatized Meanings of Criminal Abortion Law’ in R Cook, JN Erdman and BM Dickens (eds),
Abortion Law in Transnational Perspective: Cases and Controversies (University of Pennsylvania Press 2014).
15 The head of Britain’s largest charitable abortion service provider, the British Pregnancy Advisory Service
(bpas), reports that ‘[m]inisters and officials at the Department of Health have repeatedly said to us that they see
no need to change the law because it is possible to ‘‘work around’’ its deficiencies. This is not good enough. The
law as it stands undermines the delivery of safe, evidence-based abortion services.’ A Furedi, ‘A Shocking
Betrayal of Women’s Rights’ (Spiked, 28 October 2008) <www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/article/5845/>
(accessed 11 August 2015).
16 The statutory framework for abortion is contained within the first four pages of the chronologically ordered
270 pages of Blackstone’s Statutes on Medical Law (5th edn, OUP 2007), which begins with the OAPA 1861.











or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other means whatsoever with the like intent,
and whosoever, with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman, whether she be
or be not with child, shall unlawfully administer to her or cause to be taken by her
any poison or other noxious thing, or shall unlawfully use any instrument or other
means whatsoever with the like intent, shall be guilty of an offence and being
convicted thereof shall be liable to be kept in penal servitude for life.
s 59 Whosoever shall unlawfully supply or procure any poison or other noxious
thing, or any instrument or thing whatsoever, knowing that the same is intended to be
unlawfully used or employed with intent to procure the miscarriage of any woman,
whether she be or be not with child, shall be guilty of an offence, and being convicted
thereof shall be liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years.
s 60 If any woman shall be delivered of a child, every person who shall, by any
secret disposition of the dead body of the said child, whether such child died before,
at, or after its birth, endeavour to conceal the birth thereof, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and being convicted thereof shall be liable, at the discretion of the
court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years.
These provisions were passed without any debate within Parliament or,
indeed, outside it, with a remarkable silence in the editorial columns of the
Lancet and British Medical Journal and an absence of ‘letters to The Times from
mid-Victorian clergymen’.17 Potts, Diggory and Peel conclude that ‘[s]ociety in
1861 had not developed the machinery to discuss any aspect of sex openly or
objectively’ and that ‘prior to the sort of vocabulary and insight which Darwin
and Freud gave to the world, some problems were just not open to analysis—
and abortion was one of them.’18
The provisions of the OAPA had largely carried forward those of an older
statute,19 which itself had framed abortion offences in broadly similar terms
to those contained in its first (1803) legislative prohibition, when procurement
of miscarriage attracted a potential death sentence if the woman was ‘quick
with child’ or a 14-year prison term or transportation where she was not.20
Since 1861, apart from some minor changes in the available sentences,21
these ancient provisions have survived unaltered. They make no explicit
exception for therapeutic abortion,22 and provide no difference in available
sentence between a woman who self-induces her own miscarriage and a third
party abortionist. Further, the OAPA draws no distinction between abortions
17 M Potts, P Diggory and J Peel, Abortion (CUP 1977) 281–82.
18 ibid 282.
19 Offences Against the Person Act 1837.
20 Quickening is the moment when the pregnant woman first feels the fetus moving inside her. See William
Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (first published 1765, University of Chicago Press 1979).
21 See J Keown, Abortion, Doctors and the Law (CUP 1988) 167 for a helpful summary of the changes.
22 This omission was addressed in R v Bourne [1939] 1 KB 687 (CA). The lack of consideration of
therapeutic abortion was ‘consistent both with the theological position, which fears for the after-life of the
unbaptised soul, and with the medical position, the legislation dating from a time when no safe surgical
procedure had been devised for the operation’, B Dickens, Abortion and the Law (MacGibbon & Key 1966) 39.
See further Potts, Diggory and Peel (n 17) 277.











earlier and later in pregnancy, with any procedure that occurs after
implantation (6–12 days after ovulation) potentially caught by the law,23
creating serious impediments to the development and use of potentially
beneficial treatments that operate very soon after intercourse.24 In line with
the punitive values of mid-Victorian Britain, s 58 provides one of the harshest
penalties for unlawful abortion imposed by any country in Europe: only
Ireland (with a maximum 14-year prison term) currently foresees a similarly
onerous sanction.25
While s 60 is seldom discussed in accounts of abortion, the offence is
closely related to s 58, offering the possibility of prosecution for the lesser
offence of concealment of birth when a more serious offence (unlawful
procurement of miscarriage or murder of a newborn child) is suspected but
cannot be proven.26 While this aim is itself difficult to square with a
presumption of innocence, the section might nonetheless be said to retain
some modern justification as a public health measure, aiming to prevent the
irregular disposal of human bodies. However, such justification would support
classifying concealment of birth as an administrative and not a moral offence,
implying a far lower penalty.27 Indeed, any facts that would support a
prosecution under s 60 would already also be punishable as such, given that
they would ex hypothesi involve the failure to register a birth, the failure to
notify the registrar of the place and date of disposal of a dead body28 and,
possibly, the common law offence of preventing the lawful and decent burial
of a dead body.29 As such, there appears no clear need to retain this offence
on the statute books and, at the very least, there is a strong case for its
continued purpose to be considered as part of the Law Commission’s current
review.
Sections 58–60 of the OAPA are infrequently charged. Police statistics record
fewer than ten prosecutions per year under ss 58 and 59 combined in England and
23 Smeaton (n 1) [126]–[127].
24 See S Sheldon, ‘The Regulatory Cliff Edge Between Contraception and Abortion: The Legal and Moral
Significance of Implantation’ (2015) J Med Ethics <http://jme.bmj.com/content/early/2015/06/17/medethics-
2015-102712.abstract> (accessed 11 August 2015); EG Raymond and others, ‘Embracing Post-Fertilisation
Methods of Family Planning: A Call to Action’ (2013) 39 J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 244; V Tunkel,
‘Abortion: How Early, How Late, and How Legal?’ (1979) 6184 BMJ 253.
25 See Ireland’s Protection of Life During Pregnancy Act 2013. For a comparative analysis of European laws,
see K Nebel and S Hurka, ‘Abortion: Finding the Impossible Compromise’ in C Knill, C Adam and S Hurka
(eds), On the Road to Permissiveness? Change and Convergence of Moral Regulation in Europe (OUP 2015).
26 See A Loughnan, Manifest Madness: Mental Incapacity in the Criminal Law (OUP 2012) ch 8, locating this
provision within broader concerns for women’s sexual ‘immorality’, illegitimacy and poverty. Scotland’s
equivalent measure, contained in the Concealment of Birth (Scotland) Act 1809, is framed more narrowly,
providing only for cases where infanticide (rather than procurement of miscarriage) is suspected, see GH
Gordon, The Criminal Law of Scotland (W Green & Son 1967) 113.
27 G Williams, The Sanctity of Life and the Criminal Law (Faber and Faber 1958) 24.
28 Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, ss 2 and 3(1) respectively.
29 See generally, I Jones and M Quigley, ‘Preventing Lawful and Decent Burial: The Boundaries of the
Criminal Law?’ forthcoming, Legal Studies.











Wales,30 the great majority of which would appear to have been brought in the
context of assaults on a pregnant woman or the non-consensual administration of
abortifacients.31 I have succeeded in finding accounts of just two convictions of
women who have unlawfully procured miscarriages in the last ten years (each
acting well after viability),32 and no convictions of clinicians who have done so
while acting in a professional role.33 Cases involving concealment of birth are
similarly rare. Only one conviction under s 60 has been legally reported over the
last ten years, with a newspaper search revealing a small number of further cases,
none of which resulted in custodial sentences.34
B. The Infant Life Preservation Act 1929
While the OAPA makes no distinction between abortions early and late in
pregnancy, a second statute, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 (ILPA),
which applies in England and Wales,35 prohibits the intentional destruction of
‘the life of a child capable of being born alive. . . before it has an existence
independent of its mother’, unless this is done ‘in good faith for the purpose
only of preserving the life of the mother’.36 The statute was not intended to
regulate abortions but rather to close a legal loophole whereby someone who
killed a baby during the process of spontaneous birth would commit neither
the offence of unlawful procurement of miscarriage nor murder, if the child did
not yet have an existence independent of the mother and was thus not yet ‘a
person in being’.37 The Act contains a rebuttable presumption that capacity for
30 Office for National Statistics (ONS), Crime in England and Wales, Year Ending June 2014, table A4 (16
October 2014) <www.ons.gov.uk/ons/taxonomy/index.html?nscl=Crime+and+Justice#tab-data-tables> (accessed
11 August 2015).
31 eg R v Magira [2008] EWCA Crim 1939, [2009] 1 Cr App R (S) 68; R v Erin (2009, unreported). Few
such cases are legally reported and I rely here on media reports to support the claim that prosecutions appear
typically to involve non-consensual abortions, eg, BBC News, ‘Man Jailed for Miscarriage Attack’ (22 January
2003) <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/2684387.stm>; J Newton and T Thornhill, ‘Man is Jailed for Six
Years for Putting Abortion Pills into his Ex-Girlfriend’s Smoothie’ Daily News (18 March 2015) <www.dailymail.
co.uk/news/article-3000249> (both accessed 11 August 2015).
32 R v Catt [2013] EWCA Crim 1187, [2014] 1 Cr App R (S) 35; and R v Mohamed (unreported), see N
Britten, ‘Jury Convicts Mother who Destroyed Foetus’ Telegraph (26 May 2007) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/
uknews/1552651/Jury-convicts-mother-who-destroyed-foetus.html> (accessed 11 August 2015).
33 Since the Abortion Act (1967) was passed, there appears to have been just one such conviction: R v Smith
[1974] 58 Cr App R 106 (CA). In Erin (n 31), a doctor who had attempted to procure the abortion of his
pregnant lover by slipping abortifacients into her drink acted outside his medical role.
34 R v Hopkins [2005] NICC 1 Crown Court (21 January 2005). See further, eg, ‘Grandmother Admits
Concealing Births of FOUR Stillborn Babies’ Daily Mail (7 December 2010) <www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-
1311600>; ‘Mother Dumped Baby in Lake’ Independent (15 October 1992); <www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/
mother-dumped-baby-in-lake-after-birth-in-lavatory-1557501.html>; ‘Cheating Girlfriend Hid Body of Newborn
Baby’ Telegraph (14 July 2008) <www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/2403771/Cheating-girlfriend-hid-body-of-
newborn-baby-in-car-boot-to-conceal-love-affair.html> (all accessed 11 August 2015).
35 In Northern Ireland, similar provision is made by s 25 of the Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1945. In Scotland,
such provision is unnecessary because the High Court of Justiciary has inherent power to extend the scope of
existing crimes to cover unusual situations and, possibly, to create new crimes: K McKnorrie, ‘Abortion in Great
Britain: One Act, Two Laws’ [1985] Crim LR 475.
36 ILPA 1929, s 1(1).
37 See Lord Russell, HL Deb 6 December 1928, vol 72 col 444, confirming that the offence was not
concerned with abortion.











life is acquired at 28 weeks of gestation,38 reflecting the state of neonatal
medicine in the 1920s: subsequent advances mean that today this capacity is
generally accepted to be acquired around four weeks earlier.39
The hypothetical possibility for which the ILPA was introduced is one for
which it appears never to have been charged. Rather, the few prosecutions
brought under the ILPA (numbering fewer than five per year) seem again to
have involved assaults against pregnant women, resulting in miscarriage.40 In
this regard, the ILPA offers an example of the overlapping offences that the
Law Commission notes as a matter of concern elsewhere, providing an
alternative charge to (late) unlawful procurement of miscarriage under s 58 of
the OAPA. Further, if it is accepted that terminations very late in pregnancy
are more serious than those that occur earlier, the fact that conviction under
the ILPA attracts the same upper sentence as that foreseen in s 58 provides an
example of the problematic inconsistency in sentencing cited by the Law
Commission as a reason for reform in other contexts.41
The ILPA is also important for the significant role that it has played in
judicial interpretation of the OAPA. It has been held that the word ‘unlawfully’
in s 58 presupposes that, on the contrary, in certain circumstances abortion
must be lawful, with the interpretation of the term inferred from the exception
contained in the ILPA: that a miscarriage was procured for the purpose of
‘preserving [the woman’s] life’.42 This continues to form the basis for legal
abortions performed in Northern Ireland each year, where it has been subject
to an extremely restrictive interpretation.43 Only a very small number of
women in Northern Ireland who wish to end their pregnancies are thus able to
do so within the jurisdiction,44 with others either doing so clandestinely or
travelling outside it to access legal services. This means that that while taxes in
Northern Ireland contribute to NHS-funded services for other UK women,
women in Northern Ireland must find the money for a termination and any
associated travel and accommodation costs themselves.45 Along with any
problems caused by the need to arrange time off work or find childcare cover,
38 ILPA 1929, s 1(2).
39 N Marlow and others, ‘Neurological and Developmental Disability at Six Years of Age after Extremely
Preterm Birth’ (2005) 352(1) NE J Med 9.
40 See ONS (n 30) data tables. Again, while the cases are not legally reported, some facts can be gleaned from
media accounts, eg, J Narain, ‘Teenage Rapper is Charged with Child Destruction’ Daily Mail (17 August 2014)
<www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2727147> (accessed 11 August 2015).
41 The Law Commission cites s 20 (maliciously wounding or inflicting grievous bodily harm), which is seen as
more serious than s 47 (assault occasioning actual bodily harm) but carries the same maximum penalty, Law
Commission, Eleventh Programme of Law Reform (Law Com No 330, 2011) para 2.62.
42 Under Bourne (n 22) 619.
43 Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPSNI), ‘The Limited Circumstances for
Lawful Termination of Pregnancy in Northern Ireland’ (April 2013). For criticism, see G Horgan, ‘A Holy
Alliance? Obstacles to Abortion Rights in Ireland North and South’ in C Conlon, A Quilty and S Kennedy (eds),
The Abortion Papers Ireland Vol II (Cork University Press, 2015 forthcoming).
44 Between 2006 and 2014 there were 23–57 abortions per year in HSC hospitals in Northern Ireland: K
McClelland and C Kennedy, ‘Northern Ireland Termination of Pregnancy Statistics, 2013/14’ (DHSSPSNI
2015) table 2.
45 R (A and B) v Secretary of State for Health [2014] EWHC 1364 (Admin).











this may put legal abortion beyond the reach of many, leading to increasing
reliance on the purchase of abortion drugs via the internet. This offers a
potentially far cheaper option and one that avoids the need to arrange time off
work or child care cover. However, it leaves women to negotiate the risk of
encountering unscrupulous traders who supply pills that are harmful or contain
no active ingredients, or simply send nothing at all, leaving them now facing
more advanced pregnancies.46 It is thus no surprise that women in Northern
Ireland who seek legal abortions in other parts of Britain are treated at higher
gestational ages than other resident women,47 or that the status quo has been
criticised as significantly in breach of human rights norms.48
C. The Abortion Act 1967
Finally, the Abortion Act 1967 (AA), which applies in England, Wales and
Scotland, carves out a detailed therapeutic exception to prosecution for
offences relating to abortion.49 In its current form, the Act provides that:
1. (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, a person shall not be guilty of an
offence under the law relating to abortion when a pregnancy is terminated by a
registered medical practitioner if two registered medical practitioners are of the
opinion, formed in good faith—
(a) that the pregnancy has not exceeded its twenty-fourth week and that the
continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk, greater than if the pregnancy
were terminated, of injury to the physical or mental health of the pregnant
woman or any existing children of her family; or
(b) that the termination is necessary to prevent grave permanent injury to the
physical or mental health of the pregnant woman; or
(c) that the continuance of the pregnancy would involve risk to the life of the
pregnant woman, greater than if the pregnancy were terminated; or
(d) that there is a substantial risk that if the child were born it would suffer from such
physical or mental abnormalities as to be seriously handicapped.
In deciding whether the continuance of a pregnancy would involve ‘risk of
injury to health’ for the purposes of s 1(a) or (b), doctors may take account of
the pregnant woman’s ‘actual or reasonably foreseeable environment’.50
46 Horgan (n 43).
47 73 per cent of NI women are treated at under ten weeks (compared to 80 per cent of resident English and
Welsh women) and 87 per cent at under 13 weeks (compared to 92 per cent of English and Welsh women),
Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics, England and Wales: 2014’ (June 2015).
48 A successful application for judicial review of the law has been brought by the NI Human Rights
Commission, with the judgment still pending at the time of writing, H Macdonald, ‘Northern Ireland High
Court Grants Judicial Review of Abortion Law’ Guardian (2 February 2015) <www.theguardian.com/world/
2015/feb/02/northern-ireland-high-court-hears-abortion-challenge-rape-incest> (accessed 11 August 2015).
49 The Act’s differential operation in Scotland, where it carves out a therapeutic exception to a common law
offence rather than statute, is considered by McKnorrie (n 35).
50 AA 1967, s 1(2).











The overwhelming majority of legal terminations are performed on the basis
of s 1(1)(a), which explicitly allows for a broad exercise of clinical discretion.51
Modern abortion procedures are very considerably safer than carrying a
pregnancy to term and thus in all cases there will be a basis for a doctor to
reach a good faith determination that termination is indicated on the basis of
the so-called ‘statistical argument’ that it would pose a lesser risk to a woman’s
health than would continuing the pregnancy.52 There is likewise a clear basis
for an abortion to be authorised where two doctors form a good faith view that
continuing an unwanted pregnancy is likely to pose a risk to a woman’s mental
health.
The AA thus recognises an important role for doctors as gatekeepers to
abortion services.53 In addition to placing limitations on who may authorise and
perform procedures, the AA restricts the locations in which they may be
offered,54 and sets out notification requirements.55 Through such limitations, the
UK parliament of the late 1960s aimed to address the problem of backstreet
abortions, ensuring that henceforth terminations would be performed openly by
an appropriately skilled doctor, in approved premises, following a second
opinion. While the Act has been subject to repeated attempts at reform,56 it has
been amended just once. In 1990, along with some other minor amendments,57
the upper time limit for abortion under s 1(1)(d) was extended, rendering
abortion potentially lawful until term in the presence of a substantial risk of
serious fetal anomaly.
Turning to how the AA has been applied in practice, it can be seen that
reported numbers of lawful terminations steadily increased from 1968, before
stabilising in the region of 200,000 procedures per year for women resident in
England, Wales and Scotland, with 2014 seeing the lowest incidence of
abortions for over a decade.58 This represents an abortion rate that is broadly
51 In 2014, 98 per cent of abortions for English and Welsh resident women were carried out on the basis of
this section alone. See Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics’ (n 47).
52 From 2006–08, there was an overall maternal mortality rate of 11.39 per 100,000 maternities in the UK
and a maternal mortality rate relating to abortion of 0.32 per 100,000 maternities: Centre for Maternal and
Child Enquiries (CMACE), ‘Saving Mothers’ Lives. Reviewing Maternal Deaths to Make Motherhood Safer:
2006–2008’ (2011) 118 BJOG (Suppl 1:1) 203.
53 Keown (n 21); S Sheldon, Beyond Control: Medical Power and Abortion Law (Pluto 1997).
54 Except in an emergency, under s 1(3), any treatment for the termination of pregnancy may only be
performed in NHS hospitals or places approved by the Government.
55 AA 1967, s 2.
56 See Keown (n 21) ch 6, for a good account of attempted reform between 1967 and 1979; and bpas,
‘Abortion: Trusting Women to Decide and Doctors to Practise’ (bpas 2015) ch 4, for a brief overview of all
major reform efforts from 1967 to 2015.
57 A new s 3A provided a specific power to approve a ‘class of places’ for the performance of medical
abortions; s 5(2) clarified that both the AA and OAPA are engaged in the context of selective reduction of a
multiple pregnancy; s 5(1) extended the AA to offer protection from prosecution under the ILPA. In addition to
the various other drafting problems with the AA discussed below, it is noteworthy that this section is worded so as
apparently to offer protection only to the doctor and not to other healthcare professionals involved in the
termination: I Kennedy and A Grubb, Medical Law (Butterworths 2000) 1429.
58 184,571 for women resident in England and Wales and 11,475 for women resident in Scotland, see
Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics’ (n 47), and Information Services Division (ISD) Scotland,
‘Termination of Pregnancy Statistics. Year Ending 31 December 2014’ (May 2015). It is, of course, impossible to











in line with that seen in other Western countries.59 One in three women will
have an abortion at some point in her life,60 making this the most common
gynecological procedure performed in the UK and one that is sought by
women of all ages and from all walks of life. The majority (and a steadily
increasing proportion) of terminations take place early in pregnancy, with 92
per cent carried out within the first 12 weeks, only 2 per cent at over 20
weeks, and one tenth of one percent after 24 weeks.61 While unsafe abortion
remains one of the most significant causes of maternal mortality worldwide,62
in line with the hopes of those who had advocated liberalisation of the law as
a public health measure, mortality resulting from abortion is now virtually
unknown in the UK, with termination very significantly safer than carrying a
pregnancy to term.63 With the notable exception of terminations for women
in Northern Ireland,64 almost all procedures are funded by the NHS.65 In
sum, since 1967, abortion has become entrenched as a normal part of routine
healthcare, with the AA offering a platform for the provision of safe, high
quality, state-funded services, typically provided in the first trimester of
pregnancy.
However, 50 years is a long time in clinical practice and the multiple cracks
in what is now a very dated statutory framework are clear. In 1967, the
overwhelming majority of abortions were performed by risky, technically
demanding surgical techniques,66 whereas today abortions are generally
performed by straightforward, highly effective, low-risk procedures in early
pregnancy.67 Further, a high level of deference to medical authority made it
natural to entrust doctors with the kinds of social and ethical decisions that
know precisely what impact the AA has had on the numbers of abortions performed because of the difficulty of
obtaining data regarding illegal procedures.
59 15.9 per 1000 resident women in England and Wales aged 15–44; 11.0 resident women per 1000 resident
women in Scotland. This is the lowest rate for 17 years in each country, Department of Health, ‘Abortion
Statistics’ (n 47), ISD, ibid. Globally, the age standardised abortion rate stood at around 28 per 1000 in 2008,
with 24 per 1000 in developed countries or 17 per 1000 with Eastern Europe excluded, see G Sedgh and others,
‘Induced Abortion: Incidence and Trends Worldwide from 1995 to 2008’ (2012) 379 Lancet 625.
60 See Royal College of Obstetricians & Gynaecologists (RCOG), ‘The Care of Women Requesting Induced
Abortion’ (Evidence-based Clinical Guideline No 7, 2011).
61 A total of 211 in 2014. 80 per cent of abortions in England and Wales, and a similar proportion in
Scotland, occurred at under 10 weeks (compared to 77 per cent in 2012 and 58 per cent in 2003). This figure
conceals some marked regional variation, with 89 per cent of terminations in North Staffordshire but only 54 per
cent of those in the Vale of Glamorgan occurring at under ten weeks. Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics’
(n 47), and ISD (n 58).
62 The World Health Organization reports that around 47,000 deaths resulted from unsafe abortion in 2008,
representing 13 per cent of all maternal deaths, WHO, Unsafe Abortion: Global and Regional Estimates of the
Incidence of Unsafe Abortion and Associated Mortality in 2008 (6th edn, WHO 2011).
63 RCOG (n 60).
64 A and B (n 45).
65 98 per cent of abortions were funded by the NHS in 2013, with 67 per cent taking place in the independent
sector under NHS contract, Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics’ (n 47).
66 See Potts, Diggory and Peel (n 17) ch 6, on the evolution of abortion procedures.
67 95 per cent of terminations are either medical abortions (induced by drugs) or performed by vacuum
aspiration.











would today be seen as self-evidently belonging to patients. And the dangerous
backstreet procedures that provided such compelling impetus for reform have
all but disappeared in the face of the availability of safe, legal, state-funded
services. Yet while these underlying concerns have largely evaporated, the legal
infrastructure that was shaped around them continues to have a significant
effect on the way that services can be offered.
First, the Act’s requirement that two doctors must certify the need for an
abortion is grounded in the assumption that doctors, rather than women, are
best placed to decide whether an abortion is justified. In 1967, the
understanding that medical control of abortion should go well beyond that
which would accrue merely on the basis of a technical expertise reflected the
belief that ‘social conditions cannot be and ought not to be separated from
medical considerations’ and that the AA ‘by its very drafting. . . [encourages]
the concept of socio-medical care’.68 While this captures well the values that
characterised 1960s practice, modern medicine has shifted fundamentally away
from ‘doctor knows best’ paternalism: today patients are routinely trusted, and
indeed expected, to make medical decisions for themselves, with pregnant
women not treated as an exception to this fundamental legal principle in other
contexts.69 Contemporary abortion practice reflects this same evolution in
attitudes, with the broad wording of s 1(1)(a) having permitted doctors to
exercise their discretion liberally in favour of authorising abortions. However,
in the context of a consistently liberal interpretation, the requirement for two
medical signatures becomes an entirely bureaucratic one, serving no obvious
broader purpose.70 Moreover, it has also been suggested that this requirement
may, in some circumstances, breach the European Convention on Human
Rights.71
Second, the legal requirements that abortions should be performed only by a
doctor and only on approved premises are likewise unsupported by any current
medical evidence base. These provisions reflected a desire to eradicate
dangerous, clandestine abortions and to recognise the best practice of the
late 1960s when, as noted above, abortion was a far more technically
demanding and risky procedure. Today, however, these requirements have
become particularly nonsensical in the context of early medical abortion
(EMA), which accounts for around half of the terminations performed in
68 D Steel, ‘Foreword’ in K Hindell and M Simms (eds), Abortion Law Reformed (Peter Owen 1971) 7.
69 Montgomery (n 9); Re MB (Adult, Medical Treatment) [1997] 38 BMLR 175 (CA).
70 The argument that it is this liberal interpretation of the law that is at fault is discussed at nn 108–12 and
accompanying text.
71 R Scott, ‘Risks, Reasons, and Rights: The European Convention on Human Rights and English Abortion
Law’ Med L Rev (forthcoming). Scott argues that to make access to lawful abortion within early pregnancy
conditional on fulfilment of the terms of s 1(1)(a) is an unjustified interference with a woman’s private life under
article 8(2). She also raises concerns regarding the lack of a system of formal review in the event that doctors
decide not to grant a termination.











England and Wales and over 80 per cent of those in Scotland.72 In EMA, there
is no clinical need for drugs to be taken on approved premises nor for it to be a
doctor who administers or prescribes them. Indeed, the same drugs are already
taken at home in other contexts;73 a woman undergoing an EMA is allowed to
leave the approved premises immediately after taking them in order to arrive
home before her miscarriage begins; the most commonly used EMA drugs are
comparable to or safer than many drugs which are routinely prescribed by
appropriately trained other providers;74 and nurses are already permitted to
prescribe mifepristone, one of the drugs used in an EMA, for other medical
reasons.75 Further, looking beyond EMA, while late surgical procedures are
likely to require the training and skill of an experienced doctor, it seems
plausible that earlier procedures might be performed equally well by other
trained professionals.76 These restrictions thus appear redundant in terms of
safeguarding women’s health and, moreover, their rigid enforcement risks
impeding the efficient delivery of services so as to delay timely access to
abortion. Given the greater risks involved in later terminations, this creates a
clear potential for these provisions to increase the dangers to women seeking
abortion services.77 The questions of where and by whom abortion procedures
can be safely provided are, of course, empirical ones raising important health
concerns that should be answered through reference to a robust evidence base.
The modest claim defended here is that the evidence base in question should
be that offered by best current medical practice and knowledge, rather than
that of the 1960s.
In sum, UK abortion law is characterised by archaic language, overlapping
offences, inconsistencies in available sentences and clinically unwarranted
restrictions on best practice. It has also been argued that it breaches
international human rights obligations.78 So far as possible, service providers
have worked around the deficiencies in the law, resulting in a situation of good
72 Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics’ (n 47), and ISD Scotland (n 58). In 2014, for the first time,
medical abortions accounted for over half (51 per cent) of the total number of abortions performed in England
and Wales, Department of Health ibid. The term ‘medical abortion’ is used to refer to any termination of
pregnancy that is provoked using drugs.
73 eg where misoprostol is used in the treatment of miscarriage, see Science and Technology Committee,
Scientific Developments Relating to the Abortion Act 1967 (2006–07, HC 1045-1) vol 1, 105.
74 For a small taste of the literature on the safety of EMA provided by mid-level providers, see M Kishen and
Y Stedman, ‘The Role of Advanced Nurse Practitioners in the Availability of Abortion Services’ (2010) 24 Best
Practice & Research Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology 569.
75 Science and Technology Committee (n 73) 105.
76 Nurses routinely fit contraceptive coils, a procedure seen as requiring about the same level of skill as an
early surgical abortion performed by vacuum aspiration, ibid; see further V Argent and L Pavey ‘Can Nurses
Legally Perform Surgical Induced Abortion?’ (2007) 33(2) J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 79. The
World Health Organisation recommends that vacuum aspiration can be safely provided by associate clinicians,
midwives, and nurses. See WHO (2015) Health Worker Roles in Providing Safe Abortion Care and Post-
Abortion Contraception, http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/publications/unsafe_abortion/abortion-task-shifting/en/
(accessed 7 September 2015) describing how, in many parts of the world, vacuum aspirations are already offered by
midlevel providers, with similar safety records to those enjoyed by doctors.
77 See Science and Technology Committee (n 73) ch 4 for consideration of the evidence on this point.
78 See Scott (n 71). The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) has
repeatedly expressed concerns about access to abortion in Northern Ireland: CEDAW, ‘Report of the Committee











access to state-funded services in England, Wales and Scotland. This, in turn,
has served to mitigate some of the worst consequences of the very restrictive
provision in Northern Ireland and maternal mortality resulting from abortion
has been close to eradicated in the UK. However, in addition to stigmatising
women and service providers, this criminal law framework creates a number of
clinically unwarranted impediments to the provision of high quality abortion
services. If the need for good, modern abortion services is accepted, it is thus
important to question whether these negative consequences can be justified
with reference to any ongoing useful role played by the existing criminal law
framework in policing its boundaries. I move now to consider this question.
3. The Historical Purposes of Criminalising Abortion
Criminal law represents the most onerous, intrusive and punitive of state
powers and it is reasonable to assume that it should be invoked only where it
offers a necessary and proportionate means to achieve an important objective,
with the onus on those who would seek to deploy it to demonstrate that these
criteria are met.79 Moreover, any such demonstration should be subject to
particularly robust scrutiny in the abortion context, given the significant
considerations of gender equality, autonomy, and reproductive health that
point powerfully in favour of liberal access to safe, legal services. I move now to
consider the purposes served by ss 58–60 of the OAPA, read in the light of the
therapeutic exception carved out by the AA, in order to assess whether they
outweigh these other kinds of considerations.
First, it is necessary to identify what precise purpose is served by these
sections. While the legislation clearly reflects archaic, highly conservative
attitudes to gender norms, female sexuality and fertility control,80 and has
been read as part of the medical profession’s fight to establish professional
dominance over the management of pregnancy and childbirth,81 it is
commonly taken as representing an ongoing commitment to two specific
purposes. It is said to be necessary, first, to prevent or to condemn the
intentional destruction of fetal life; and, second, to prevent harm to
women.82 As noted above, the ILPA was introduced for very specific
on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women’ (A/54/38/Rev 1, 1999) paras 309–10; CEDAW, ‘Summary
Record of the 844th Meeting’ (CEDAW/C/SR 844, 2008) para 289.
79 Jareborg, Husak, Packer (all n 12). This principle might be extended to suggest that criminal laws should
be occasionally reviewed and not allowed to stagnate on the statute books, Packer (n 12).
80 As a powerful illustration of late 19th century moral norms, Munby J describes the 1878 case of Annie
Besant, whose daughter was removed from her custody with Besant judged unfit to raise her because she had
written and published a treatise on contraceptive methods, Smeaton (n 1) [174]–[178], discussing Re Besant
(1878) 11 Ch D 508.
81 Keown (n 21).
82 These were accepted as the twin purposes of the OAPA in Smeaton (n 1) [354]. See further Keown ibid and
Dickens (n 22). Williams (n 27) 146 identifies this second purpose as the more important one, suggesting that ‘[t]he











reasons unrelated to abortion. Broadly, however, it also might be said to be
concerned with the protection of late fetal life.
Today, the OAPA and ILPA must also be read in conjunction with the AA,
which is equally said to be underpinned by two broad parliamentary purposes.
First, the AA also reflects a concern with preventing harm to women, aiming to
‘ensure that the abortion is carried out with all proper skill and in hygienic
conditions’. Second, it was to extend access to abortion in a way that foresaw
ongoing control over a controversial procedure, being intended ‘to broaden the
grounds upon which abortions may be lawfully obtained’, permitting only those
abortions that were deemed ‘socially acceptable’.83 Combined, then, we might
say that the current criminal framework aims both to prevent harm to women
and to prevent or condemn the intentional destruction of fetal life when this
does not take place within tightly medically controlled circumstances. How well
does current legislation further these goals?
A. Preventing Harm to Women
In 1861, abortion was a technically demanding, dangerous surgical procedure,
offering clear medical grounds to support limiting its use to only the most
compelling of cases.84 By 1967, while termination procedures were far safer,
they still carried significant risks.85 Today, however, the claim that the
restrictive, criminal prohibitions contained in the OAPA might be in any way
justified by concerns for women’s health is simply unsustainable. As noted
above, in the UK abortion carries a far lower risk of maternal death than does
carrying a pregnancy to term.86 Claims that abortion causes breast cancer or
infertility have been demonstrated to be scientifically baseless.87 Likewise, in
mental health terms, there is no good evidence to support suggestions that
abortion injures women psychologically.88 While women are not harmed by
safe, legal abortion, however, they are significantly and demonstrably harmed
where the enforcement of restrictive criminal laws obliges them to seek out
illegal terminations. While maternal mortality resulting from abortion has now
been close to eliminated in the UK,89 unsafe abortion is estimated to result in
chief evil of an abortion is no longer thought to be the loss of the unborn child, but the injury done to the mother
by the unskilled abortionist’.
83 Royal College of Nursing v Department for Health and Social Security [1981] AC 800 (HL) 827, 835. Cited
approvingly in Doogan v Greater Glasgow Health Board [2014] UKSC 68, [2015] AC 640 [27].
84 Potts, Diggory and Peel (n 17) 282; Keown (n 21) 36–37.
85 Potts, Diggory and Peel (n 17) ch 6. S Sood ‘Some Operative and Postoperative Hazards of Legal
Termination of Pregnancy’ (1971) 5782(4) BMJ 270 describes a morbidity rate of 16.8 per cent and one death
among 1317 patients admitted for NHS abortions from 1967–70.
86 RCOG (n 60).
87 ibid 42–44. The RCOG does note a small increase in the risk of subsequent preterm birth, which increases
with the number of abortions, concluding however there is insufficient evidence to imply causality, ibid 44–45.
88 ibid 45–46; Academy of Medical Royal Colleges (AOMRC), ‘Induced Abortion and Mental Health: A
Systematic Review’ (December 2011).
89 CMACE (n 52).











around 47,000 deaths each year worldwide, with these deaths overwhelmingly
concentrated in countries with strictly enforced prohibitive legislation.90
Further, there is some evidence to suggest that women with negative attitudes
towards abortion are more likely to experience mental health problems
following a termination,91 and it therefore also seems probable that the
stigmatising effect of criminal prohibitions on abortion may contribute to
damaging women’s psychological health.
In Britain, the prohibition on abortion must be read in connection with the
therapeutic exception carved out by the AA. As noted above, the liberal
interpretation of the latter has meant that the very few prosecutions for
unlawful procurement of miscarriage or child destruction have tended to be
reserved for cases involving non-consensual or very late terminations. However,
the offences also potentially capture healthcare professionals who fail to comply
with the bureaucratic requirements imposed by the AA and those women who
are unable or unwilling to access legal services. Women on the Web, a feminist
medical collective that prescribes and supplies abortion drugs via the internet,
reports that drugs are frequently supplied to women in Northern Ireland and
that regular requests are received from elsewhere in the UK, with the following
cases typical:
We had an Islamic girl forbidden from leaving the house without a chaperone. How is
she going to get to an abortion clinic? She can’t. For her, her only option might be
that she could get the medicine sent to her by post. We have British women in
abusive relationships whose boyfriend will beat the hell out of her if he finds out she
is pregnant and wants an abortion.92
While it would clearly be preferable for these women to have the possibility
of accessing formal health services (and, where necessary, a referral to other
support), the threat of potential life imprisonment does not obviously perform
any useful role in protecting them. Further, insofar as the purpose of the
abortion prohibition is to safeguard women’s health, it seems odd to include
women themselves within its scope: concerns regarding the dangers of women
being injured in the course of elective cosmetic surgery, for example, have
rightly led to calls for greater regulation of services rather than demands that
women who put their health in the hands of unskilled providers should be
punished for so doing.93 These women are, of course, unlikely to be
prosecuted. However the fact that a law is not likely to be enforced is the
poorest of justifications for its retention.
Might the existence of legal abortion be harmful to women in a different
way, leaving them open to coercion to terminate wanted pregnancies? This
90 Sedgh and others (n 59).
91 AOMRC (n 88).
92 Rebecca Gomperts, cited in H Rumbelow, ‘The Woman who Offers Abortions on the High Seas’ The
Times, 2 Supplement (22 October 2014).
93 Department of Health, ‘Review of the Regulation of Cosmetic Interventions’ (April 2013).











claim has been significant in discussions regarding sex selective abortion, where
it was presented as the dominant concern motivating one recent reform
attempt purporting to clarify the illegality of this practice.94 The sponsor of the
Bill, Fiona Bruce MP, described three cases, each of which focused on harm to
pregnant women. Her first case was that of a vicious, unlawful assault by a
husband on his pregnant wife, following his discovery that she was carrying a
female fetus.95 His actions would clearly be punishable under existing criminal
law, whether or not he provoked a miscarriage, and while her situation
highlights the need for services to support those suffering domestic abuse, the
attacked woman would be assisted in no obvious way by a criminal prohibition
on sex selective abortion. Bruce’s second example concerned women who
come under familial pressure to abort female fetuses, being forced to lie to
abortion providers about their reasons for seeking to terminate a pregnancy.96
Such cases underline the importance of robust procedures in clinics to ensure
the voluntariness of a woman’s consent: specifically, clinics should see each
woman with no escort present, in order that she is given the fullest opportunity
to discuss any pressures on her; and any translator used should be independent
(rather than a partner or family member).97 Again, however, it is unclear that a
specific prohibition on sex selective abortion adds anything to the existing law
(particularly in circumstances where women are coerced to lie about their
reasons for terminating a pregnancy). Further, if the harm cited involves
coercion, there is no obvious reason to single out sex selection for specific
regulation: the voluntariness of consent is important in all cases.
Bruce’s third example is the story of Rupinder, who had chosen to terminate
her pregnancy on the basis that she was expecting a girl:
[Rupinder] was the eldest of six girls and she recalls that each time her mother went
to hospital how disappointed everyone was when each time it was a girl. This
experience traumatised and consumed her so much that the thought of giving birth to
a girl meant disappointment, betrayal and lowered status within the family and the
community. Rupinder made a painful decision to abort which she now regrets as she
felt that she had no other choice.98
This tragic case again underlines the need for robust informed consent
provisions, the availability of high quality counselling and for women to be
allowed adequate time fully to consider their choices. However, it is naı¨ve to
imagine that banning sex selective abortion would address the structural sexism
identified here and it is these cultural pressures that are harmful to Rupinder
94 Abortion (Sex Selection) Bill (2014–15), HC Deb 4 November 2014, vol 587, cols 677–79. This Bill was
withdrawn before its second reading, with a similarly worded proposed amendment to the Serious Crime Bill
(2014–15) subsequently defeated. See HC, Notices of Amendments 1479: www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/
bills/cbill/2014-2015/0116/amend/pbc1162201a.1479-1480.html (accessed 11 August 2015).
95 ibid 678.
96 ibid.
97 As illustrated in R v Ahmed [2010] EWCA Crim 1949, [2011] QB 512.
98 Bruce (n 94) 677–78.











rather than the existence of legal abortion, not least as refusing access to such
services does not remove the possibility of terminating a pregnancy but only
limits her ability to do so safely. It is also cruelly ironic to focus efforts on
addressing such sexism through the state aligning itself with Rupinder’s family
and community in refusing her control over her own fertility.
In sum, the structural sexism that leads to the practice of sex selective
abortion is deplorable, a fortiori, when it manifests itself in violence and
coercion. However, the examples above do not present a case for specific
criminal prohibition but rather illustrate that fully respecting women’s autonomy
in this context requires not just robust consent procedures but also active
commitment to securing the best possible conditions within which reproductive
choice may be exercised. Moreover, there are strong practical reasons for being
wary of seeking a response to these problems within the criminal law. A specific
prohibition on sex selection is likely to be unworkable in practice and, if
rigorously pursued, could not fail to be highly intrusive. Either screening out the
very small number of cases where a termination might be sought for this reason
would involve close questioning of all woman (not least given Bruce’s concern
with women persuaded to lie about their motivation) or, alternatively, it might
potentially lead to a kind of racial profiling, with enhanced suspicion and
scrutiny of women from particular ethnic communities.
Bruce’s arguments reflect the currency of what Siegel has identified as a
significant ‘woman protective turn’ in arguments for restricting access to
abortion.99 However, I have argued that the claim that liberal access to
abortion harms women is as unconvincing in this specific context as it is more
generally. If there is a continuing purpose for criminal prohibitions against
abortion, then this can only lie in the claim that they are necessary to prevent
or condemn the intentional destruction of fetal life.
B. Preventing or Condemning the Intentional Destruction of Fetal Life
As I noted earlier, in Britain there would appear to be significant support for
the view that while not a full moral person with equal ethical status to someone
who has been born, the human fetus is of moral value and holds a significance
that increases as it grows throughout pregnancy.100 However, this alone is
insufficient to ground a criminal prohibition on abortion. First, the moral
respect due to fetal life must be weighed against the significance of respect for
99 R Siegel, ‘The New Politics of Abortion: An Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions’
[2007] U Ill L Rev 991.
100 See the polling data considered below (at nn 113–1-6 and accompanying text). As I also note above also,
my argument is not likely to convince those who believe that all human life is sacred or that abortion is morally
equivalent to murder. However, I follow Dworkin (n 6), in assuming that moral objections to abortion are, for
most, not grounded in this view, with this assumption supported by the fact that only 6% per cent of those
questioned in a recent survey believed that abortion should be banned in all circumstances: see YouGov poll for
the Sunday Times, http://cdn.yougov.com/cumulus_uploads/document/y4asheswh1/YG-Archives-Pol-ST-results-
13-150112.pdf (accessed 4 June11 August 2015), discussed further below (at n 148).











women’s autonomy, gender equality and reproductive health. And, second,
even if the scales are judged to come down on the side of protection of fetal
life, it is also necessary to consider whether a criminal prohibition performs a
useful function in achieving that end (either through preventing or condemning
the destruction of the fetus).
Do restrictive abortion laws serve to prevent abortion? While the answer to
this question is less straightforward than is often suggested, it is clear that even
the most stringent attempts to enforce restrictive abortion laws will not succeed
in all cases. At the extreme, Ceausescu’s Romania saw abortion prohibitions
rigorously enforced, with illegal abortion nonetheless remaining commonplace
and maternal mortality rates soaring.101 International data confirms that
strictly enforced legal prohibitions are, at best, a poor indicator of low abortion
rates and, indeed, tend to correlate negatively with them.102 Rather, a lower
incidence of abortion reflects a lower incidence of unplanned pregnancy which,
in turn, reflects the availability and use of contraception.103 However, it is also
true that not all women who are refused a legal termination will seek out and
secure an illegal one: sometimes, a refusal will result in a pregnancy continuing.
While there is no good data regarding the relative incidence of illegal abortions
and continuing pregnancies following a refusal, we can conclude that restrictive
laws will prevent some, but by no means all, abortions. The cost of preventing
some terminations and, thus, saving some fetal lives in this way must thus be
measured not just in the moral, social and physical harms of enforced
pregnancy, childbirth and child rearing; it must also be measured in the
financial and emotional costs to women of needing to access terminations
outside of their own jurisdiction and the maternal mortality and morbidity that
typically accompany illegal abortions.
In many countries, a response to this moral calculation has been non-
enforcement of the restrictive, punitive laws retained on the statute books,
turning a blind eye to widespread disregard of them. Britain offered a clear
example of this phenomenon even before the partial decriminalisation achieved
by the AA, with few convictions for abortion offences and vanishingly small
numbers of prosecutions of women who had undergone terminations or of
doctors who had performed them in line with good medical practice.104 As
noted above, there have been still fewer such prosecutions since 1967.
Likewise, the very restrictive legal framework in Northern Ireland currently
101 See M Horga, C Gerdts and M Potts, ‘The Remarkable Story of Romanian Women’s Struggle to Manage
their Fertility’ (2013) 39 J Fam Plann Reprod Health Care 2, describing the peaking of maternal mortality at 147
per 100,000 in 1989. To compare with the UK maternal mortality rate noted above, see CMACE (n 52).
102 Abortion rates tend to be lower in sub-regions with liberal abortion laws: the lowest sub-regional rates of
abortion (12 per 1000 women) are in Western Europe, where laws are least restrictive, and some of the highest
sub-regional rates (29–39 per 1000) are in Latin America, where laws are generally very restrictive: Sedgh and
others (n 59).
103 ibid. See further, CF Westoff, A New Approach to Estimating Abortion Rates (DHS Analytical Studies No
13, Macro International Health 2008).
104 For discussion, see Sheldon (n 53) 21–24.











appears to coexist with a significant incidence of illegal terminations using
drugs purchased on line. The absence of appetite for prosecuting the women
who break the law in this way was recently demonstrated by the lack of any
official response to an open letter, signed by over one hundred people, stating
that they had either terminated pregnancies using this means or assisted others
to do so.105
This situation of practical access to abortion and non-enforcement of the
criminal law can be viewed as a response to the moral calculation described
above, suggesting that as a society we have already implicitly chosen to value
women’s autonomy and health over the attempt to protect fetal life through the
criminal law. This is demonstrated through the weak enforcement of the law, the
fact that even opponents of liberal abortion law now often frame their arguments
in terms of women’s health rather than the sanctity of fetal life,106 and in surveys
showing strong popular support for a woman’s right to choose.107 In other
contexts, the fact that criminal prohibitions are so rarely and selectively enforced
might be accepted as reason for their removal. Here, however, the stigma
attached to abortion and the reluctance of politicians to confront the issue has
led to legislative stagnation and the achievement of good access to legal abortion
services through an implicit acceptance of liberal interpretation of the law, rather
than the statutory reform that would be necessary to bring it into line with
modern practice. Yet in the light of this current liberal interpretation, it is
difficult to escape the conclusion that our current abortion legislation serves no
ongoing purpose in preventing the destruction of fetal life.
Here, of course, it might be objected that the appropriate response is
precisely not to accept this liberal exercise of discretion as a basis for viewing
controls over abortion as redundant but rather to demand that they be more
rigorously enforced. Such a view seems implicitly to inform the Department of
Health’s recent ‘Guidance in Relation to Requirements of the Abortion Act
1967’, which suggests that whilst not strictly legally required, it is ‘good
practice’ for at least one of the doctors who authorises an abortion to see the
105 For details, see R Whitaker and G Horgan, ‘Abortion Governance in the New Northern Ireland’ in L
Anton, S De Zordo and J Mishtal (eds), A Right That Isn’t? Abortion Governance and Associated Protest Logics in
Postwar Europe (Berghahn 2015 forthcoming). A prosecution is reported to be currently underway, under s 59 of
the OAPA, against a woman who is alleged to have purchased abortion drugs online for her daughter, see A
Erwin, ‘Belfast Woman Will Go on Trial’ Belfast Telegraph (19 June 2015) <www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/
northern-ireland/belfast-woman-will-go-on-trial-for-helping-her-daughter-to-have-a-medical-abortion-31314912.
html> (accessed 11 August 2015). This has provoked a second letter, now with over 200 signatories, with the
Police Service of Northern Ireland said to be looking into the matter, see R Sanghani, ‘‘‘Arrest Us’’: Northern
Irish Women Want to be Prosecuted’ Telegraph (26 June 2015) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/women/womens-life/
11700651/Abortion-Northern-Irish-women-want-arrest-over-illegal-abortion-pills.html (accessed 11 August
2015).
106 This is more true at the parliamentary level (where it can be seen, for example, in Fiona Bruce’s
arguments, discussed at nn 94–98 and accompanying text) than in the activities of pro-life pressure groups, which
tend to focus on the need to protect human life from the moment of conception: see, for example, the websites of
Abort 67, www.abort67.co.uk and the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children, www.spuc.org.uk/ (each
last visited 11 August 2015).
107 See nn 115–17 and accompanying text.











pregnant woman in person (rather than relying on the assessment of other
members of the healthcare team, as might be accepted medical practice in
other contexts).108 It further provides that the doctor must make an individual
assessment of the woman, rather than simply relying on a general application of
the ‘statistical argument’ described above as a justification for the legality of
any early termination, or relying on the assessment of other members of the
multi-disciplinary team treating the woman.109
No justification for requiring a more robust level of medical scrutiny appears
in the ‘Guidance’ and, notably, reference is given neither to legal authority nor
to a medical evidence base in support of the Department’s restrictive reading of
the legislation, leaving the reader to speculate as to what it aims to achieve. It
may be, for example, that the intention is that an enhanced level of medical
scrutiny is intended to result in more women being dissuaded from terminating
pregnancies or refused access to legal services. One powerful justification
advanced in the 1960s in favour of entrenching the doctor as ‘gatekeeper’ was
precisely that doctors might somehow take control of a woman’s situation and
offer the kind of persuasion and support that would convince her to continue
with her pregnancy.110 Yet whatever force this idea had in the 1960s, to modern
eyes it appears troublingly coercive to suggest that the doctor’s role should be
one of active discouragement of abortion. Such conduct would constitute as
clear a breach of the professional obligation to provide accurate information and
non-directive counselling as would an attempt to persuade a woman to end a
pregnancy (as the ‘Guidance’ appears to recognise).111 Further, there would
appear to be no strong contemporary support for requiring doctors to refuse
more abortions: at least in early pregnancy (when a large majority of
terminations occur), modern views tend towards seeing abortion as the
woman’s choice.112 As noted above, this is implicitly accepted even in many
political attacks on abortion services, which often argue not against liberal
abortion access per se but rather suggest that existing consent provisions are
insufficiently robust, leaving vulnerable women open to exploitation and abuse.
Yet if it is not the intention that the doctor’s role should be to refuse or to
persuade against abortion, then demanding a tighter level of medical scrutiny
appears, oddly, to be demanding that control happens entirely for its own sake.
Finally, it might be suggested that even if the criminal law is not enforced, it
nonetheless offers the best available means for society to express its strong
condemnation of the intentional destruction of fetal life as an important prima
108 See Department of Health, ‘Guidance in Relation to Requirements of the Abortion Act 1967’ (May 2014)
para 6.
109 ibid [12], [20] and [21]. For a critical reading of the ‘Guidance’, see D Flower, ‘Certifying Abortions: The
Signing of HSA1 Forms’ in bpas, Britain’s Abortion Law: What it Says and Why (bpas 2013) 22.
110 See generally, Sheldon (n 53) 24–27.
111 Department of Health, ‘Guidance’ (n 108) para 32 provides that ‘[p]atients should be able expect
impartial advice from the NHS and CCGs’. See also General Medical Council (GMC), ‘Personal Beliefs and
Medical Practice’ (March 2013).
112 See the polling data discussed at nn 113–16 and accompanying text.











facie moral wrong or, at least, to underscore the moral gravitas of the abortion
decision. However, even putting to one side more general concerns regarding
the deployment of criminal law as a means of expressing moral disapproval,
there are reasons for rejecting the specific application of this justification here.
First, it seems strange to require our criminal law to express a moral message
that is so poorly aligned with contemporary moral views on abortion. In a
recent poll, just over half of those surveyed supported the view that ‘a woman
should not have to continue with her pregnancy if she wants an abortion’.113 A
second question, asked in the same survey, provided an even stronger response
(with the difference between these two figures perhaps reflecting a restrictive
view of the appropriate role of government in this context): when asked to
select the statement that best reflected their views, only 17 per cent selected the
statement that ‘the Government has a responsibility to reduce the number of
abortions’, compared to the 70 per cent who chose the statement that ‘it’s a
woman’s right to choose whether or not to have an abortion and the
Government should not interfere’.114 While any polling data will be influenced
by virtue of the exact question asked, no major poll in the last five years has
identified the kind of substantive moral consensus against abortion that might
justify its criminal prohibition, at least prior to viability.115 This remains the
case for polling data gathered from those who identify as Christian.116
Second, the idea that the moral gravitas of a decision must be communicated
by ensuring that it is made by doctors, rather than by the women who must live
with the consequences of it, provides a clear reflection of the medical
paternalism of the 1960s, which is poorly aligned with the values that inform
modern British medical law.117 The significance of the shift that has occurred
over the last decades was powerfully recognised in the recent, unanimous,
seven judge Supreme Court decision in Montgomery v Lanarkshire (2015),
reflecting the extent to which social and legal developments over the last
113 15 per cent very strongly agreed, 12 per cent strongly agreed, 27 per cent agreed and 17 per cent
disagreed. Ipsos MORI, ‘Public Attitudes towards Abortion’ <www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/
researcharchive/2854/Public-Attitudes-towards-Abortion.aspx> (accessed 11 August 2015). A representative
quota sample of 953 adults were interviewed face-to-face in their own homes in August 2011 at 156 sampling
points across Great Britain, with data then weighted to match the profile of the population.
114 ibid.
115 Packer’s authoritative account suggests that ‘the criminal sanction should ordinarily be limited to conduct
that is viewed, without significant social dissent, as immoral. The calendar of crimes should not be enlarged
beyond that point and, as views about morality shift, should be contracted’ (n 12) 264. For a counterview, see G
Lamond, ‘What is a Crime?’ (2007) 27 OJLS 609, 617. The issue of later terminations is considered below.
116 Ipso MORI conducted 1136 face-to-face interviews with those who were recorded as Christian in the 2011
Census, or who would have recorded themselves as such. Of those interviewed, 63 per cent agreed that, within
the legal time limit, an adult woman with an unwanted pregnancy should be able to have an abortion if she wants
one, compared to 20 per cent against, with the remainder neither agreeing nor disagreeing, not knowing, or
preferring not to say. See Ipsos MORI for Richard Dawkins Foundation for Reason and Science (UK), ‘Religious
and Social Attitudes of UK Christians in 2011’ <www.ipsos-mori.com/researchpublications/researcharchive/
2921/Religious-and-Social-Attitudes-of-UK-Christians-in-2011.aspx> (accessed 11 August 2015).
117 See Jackson for an early analysis of the tension between abortion legislation and the increasingly strong
commitment to patient autonomy in medical law: E Jackson, ‘Abortion, Autonomy and Prenatal Diagnosis’
(2000) 9 Social & Legal Studies 467.











decades ‘point away from a model of the relationship between the doctor and
patient based upon medical paternalism’:118
What they point towards is an approach to the law which, instead of treating patients
as placing themselves in the hands of their doctors . . . treats them so far as possible as
adults who are capable of understanding that medical treatment is uncertain of
success and may involve risks, accepting responsibility for the taking of risks affecting
their own lives, and living with the consequences of their choices.119
In the light of such a shift, which is equally visible in codes of professional
ethics,120 the fact that ending a pregnancy involves a morally serious decision
appears to be all the more reason for formally recognising, and strongly
communicating, that it is pregnant women themselves who must make it.
Thirdly, in any case, it is by no means obvious what message the OAPA
succeeds in expressing. Given that people are far more likely to be aware of the
widespread availability of abortion services in Britain than of the wording of the
relevant statutes, they might reasonably believe that law communicates a rather
permissive message.121 For those who know the formal letter of the law, the
criminal prohibitions of the OAPA taken alone might appear to express the
idea that abortion is a serious moral wrong (potentially meriting the same life
sentence as does murder),122 at all gestations, and regardless of by whom it is
performed. However, read in conjunction with the AA, the message is rather
different: that abortion is seriously morally wrong when not carried out under
medical orders and in line with the best medical practice of the 1960s. In this
light, the clearest message expressed by the two statutes taken together might
appear to be one of women’s relative incapacity to make morally significant
decisions and a refusal of the importance of updating laws in line with modern
medical science, even when this serves to hinder clinical best practice.
In sum, our abortion law, as currently interpreted, fails to fulfil any
demonstrable modern purpose. While its bearing on the incidence of abortion
118 Montgomery (n 9) [81].
119 ibid.
120 On the general importance of informed consent in medical practice, see GMC, ‘Consent: Patients and
Doctors Making Decisions Together’ (2008) para 5; GMC, ‘Good Medical Practice’ (2013). For confirmation
that pregnant women should not be treated as an exception to the principle of respect for patient autonomy, see
NICE Guidelines, ‘Caesarean Section’ (CG132, November 2011), providing that: ‘A pregnant woman is entitled
to decline the offer of treatment such as CS, even when the treatment would clearly benefit her or her baby’s
health. Refusal of treatment needs to be one of the woman’s options’, para 1.1.2.3. On the need for the provision
of clear, evidence-based information that will allow women to make their own decisions in the context of
abortion, see RCOG (n 60). For a clear statement that pregnant women themselves should make decisions
regarding the termination of pregnancy see Royal College of General Practitioners, ‘Position Statement on
Abortion’ (RCGP 2012).
121 As far back as 1972, many people understood the AA 1967 as allowing ‘abortion on demand’: RCOG,
‘Unplanned Pregnancy: Report of the Working Party of the RCOG’ (February 1972) 87. Kadish argues that the
‘moral message communicated by the law is contradicted by the total absence of enforcement’: S Kadish, ‘The
Crisis of Overcriminalisation’ (1967) 374 Annals of the American Academy of Pol and Soc Sci 157, 159.
122 eg, Cooke J sentencing Sarah Catt under s 58 OAPA found that ‘the child in the womb here was so near
to birth that in my judgement all right thinking people would consider this offence more serious than
manslaughter or any offence on the calendar other than murder.’ R v Sarah Louise Catt, Sentencing Remarks
(Crown Court Leeds, 17 September 2012) [16].











is unknown, it serves to stigmatise women seeking abortions and those who
care for them,123 and to impose clinically unwarranted, purely bureaucratic
restrictions on medical practice. While it is likely that a more rigorous
enforcement of the law would result in preventing some (but by no means all)
abortions, this would come with inevitable costs measurable not just in terms
of gender equality, reproductive health, and autonomy but also, potentially, in
maternal mortality and morbidity. These are costs which modern British
society appears unwilling to pay. Further, it would be contrary to accepted
ethical practice for doctors to attempt to dissuade women from terminating
pregnancies and there appears to be no general public appetite for Government
to assume a more active role in seeking to reduce the number of abortions.124
Yet if the law is not enforced in this more active, restrictive way, it appears to
be redundant and this, in itself, offers a strong justification for root and branch
reform.
Legal reform resulting in abortion being available on request as a part of
mainstream healthcare services would serve to update our laws in line with
current medical practice and modern moral values. Moreover, such a move
would provide a far better reflection of the broad principles set out at the
beginning of this paper. It would recognise the importance of fertility control as
a key part of ensuring women’s reproductive health and full participation in
society, and it would accord with respect for patient autonomy, removing a
significant anomaly in the current law. The elimination of the current
unnecessary bureaucracy built into the existing framework might make a
modest contribution to abortions taking place earlier in pregnancy and in ways
that are safer, more effective and more acceptable to women.125 Further, there
is no reason to believe that decriminalisation would have any negative impact
on provision for informed consent: this would remain, as now, subject both to
the standards of general medical practice and specific professional guidance.
Finally, as noted throughout, a substantial evidence base supports the clinical
safety and acceptability of these changes.
The most significant objection to my argument lies, of course, in the claim
that decriminalisation of abortion would offer less appropriate recognition of
the moral respect due to the human fetus. I conceded at the outset that I am
unlikely to convince those who hold that the fetus is a full moral person and
that ending a pregnancy is morally equivalent to murder.126 Yet speaking to
those others, who appear to form a very substantial majority in modern
Britain, I have sought to demonstrate that there is a strong case for reform.
First, as currently interpreted, existing law does not play any role in
123 Cook (n 14).
124 See n 114 and accompanying text.
125 Science and Technology Committee (n 73) [99]; EJ Lee and R Ingham, ‘Why Do Women Present Late for
Abortion?’ (2010) 24 Best Practice & Research Clinical Obstetrics and Gynaecology 479.
126 See n 11 and accompanying text.











preventing the intentional destruction of fetal life: were the law to be
modernised in the way that I suggest, there is no reason to believe that this
would have a significant impact on the incidence of abortions.127 Second,
liberalising the law is likely to have a modest effect in further improving the
proportion of abortions that take place very early in pregnancy,128 with this a
welcome outcome for those who take a gradualist view of the moral value of
fetal life. Most notably, if decriminalisation paves the way to the opening up
of abortion services within Northern Ireland, then early abortion rates for
Northern Irish women might potentially improve in line with those elsewhere
in the UK. Third, there is a wealth of evidence that suggests that a concern
for protecting fetal life can be more effectively pursued through policies that
attack the incidence of unwanted pregnancy (for example, through improving
the quality of sex education and contraceptive provision, and making
motherhood a more realistic possibility for women struggling to balance
childcare alongside other commitments).129 Fourth, for those who accept the
merits of an expressivist role for the law, I have suggested above that the
message communicated by our current legislation is, at best, ambiguous.
Decriminalisation would, however, mean that it would be women who would
carry the responsibility for decisions regarding abortion, including weighing
the ethical significance of ending the life of the embryo or fetus. Reform
might, therefore, be seen as expressing the view that women are as capable as
their doctors of making morally serious decisions.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that a minority of people are likely to
continue to believe that abortion constitutes a significant moral wrong. In a
plural democracy, it is important that nothing would require those who hold
this view to make use of abortion services. Further, of course, they would
retain the right to make known their views and to attempt to convince others
through legitimate forms of political protest. Finally, as I suggest below, a
right of conscientious objection could offer continued protection to those
healthcare professionals who do not wish to be involved in the provision of
abortion services. However it is equally important that the views of a vocal
minority should not be able to impede access to services or to stigmatise the
many who take an equally sincerely held different moral view.
4. The Extent and Effect of Decriminalisation
The removal of specific criminal penalties relating to abortion in the UK
would, of necessity, require a process of parliamentary reform,130 involving a
127 The example of Victoria is instructive here (n 131 and accompanying text). I address later terminations
and Northern Ireland as two possible exceptions to this claim at nn 143–50 and accompanying text.
128 Science and Technology Committee (n 73).
129 See Sedgh and others (n 59) and Westoff (n 103).
130 There is no mechanism whereby statutory provisions might simply be swept away by decision of a UK
court, as in the Canadian Supreme Court decision in R v Morgentaler [1988] 1 SCR 30. Even if (aspects of) the











radical revision of the law, yet one that would be likely to have anything but a
radical impact on practice in England, Wales and Scotland. I have space here
to do no more than to suggest some broad principles that should inform such a
process. Most fundamentally, under the reform proposed, the destruction of
fetal life would no longer provide an independent justification for criminal
sanction, though such sanction should remain available to recognise the
important harm done to a woman who is subjected to a non-consensual
abortion. Below, I briefly consider the general impact of the removal of specific
criminal penalties relating to abortion, before noting two particular ‘hard
cases’, which would require careful consideration within any reform process.
A. The Broad Impact of Decriminalisation
In 2008, the Australian state of Victoria followed Western Australia and the
Australian Capital Territory in decriminalising abortion, removing prohibitions that
had been closely modelled on those contained in the OAPA.131 The reform was
designed to modernise the law, bringing it into line with current clinical practice
and making terminations neither more freely available nor more difficult to
access.132 In the words of one commentator, the resulting legislation represented:
a profound shift in the relationship between the state and its female citizens. It changes
both nothing and everything. Nothing, because the number, rate and incidence of
abortion will not change. And everything, because for the first time women will be
recognised as the authors of our own lives. With that comes our full citizenship.133
Given current, liberal access to abortion services within the existing law, there
is good reason to believe that this claim would hold generally true in the UK.
Further, there seems little reason to fear that sweeping away specific criminal
prohibitions might lead to the re-emergence of the problems that provided the
impetus for the introduction of the AA, with profit driven, sometimes poorly
qualified providers left free to prey on vulnerable women.134 In the same way
that a specific criminal law provision prohibiting amateur dentistry is
unnecessary to discourage patients from seeking out unqualified providers,
women are highly unlikely to frequent backstreet abortionists in a context
current law were to be found incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, a UK court is
empowered only to issue a declaration of incompatibility, leaving Parliament to address the offending provisions:
s 4, Human Rights Act 1998.
131 See generally, Victoria Law Reform Commission (VLRC), ‘Law of Abortion’ (Final Report 15, 2008);
J Morgan, ‘Abortion Law Reform: The Importance of Democratic Change’ (2012) 35 UNSWLJ 142.
132 VLRC ibid.
133 J Wainer, ‘Celebrate Sisters, The Battle is Won’ New Matilda (25 November 2008), https://newmatilda.
com/2008/11/25/celebrate-sisters-battle-won (accessed 11 August 2015).
134 As is clear from Woodside’s important study, the extent to which this generalisation offers an accurate
description of early illegal abortion providers is open to debate, see M Woodside, ‘Attitudes of Women
Abortionists’ (1963) 11(2) Howard J Penology and Crime Prevention 93.











where free, safe, confidential services are available within the NHS.135 And
were recourse to the backstreets to occur, surgical terminations would fall
within common law provisions governing all invasive procedures where consent
does not offer a defence to the infliction of actual or grievous bodily harm.136
Whether this prohibition would capture abortions performed by unqualified
providers using less invasive techniques is not clear. However, if the guiding
concern is not with the ending of a pregnancy per se but rather, as for other
procedures, with ensuring fully informed, voluntary consent and safeguarding
women’s health, then this question would appropriately turn on the intention
of the abortionist, the woman’s consent, the seriousness of the invasion and the
level of harm caused, with these factors relevant to the determination of the
existence and severity of the general criminal offences of common assault, or
assault causing actual or grievous bodily harm.137 Where the safety of patients
is negligently or wilfully jeopardised, professionals (like unqualified abortion-
ists) can likewise face potential action in the civil or criminal courts,138 with
deviations from appropriate practice also potentially provoking disciplinary
sanction or action by the Care Quality Commission. In practice, abortion
doctors who act outside accepted medical practice may already be more likely
to find themselves sanctioned by disciplinary bodies rather than by courts, with
the General Medical Council sometimes seen as better equipped to provide a
thorough exploration of the boundaries of acceptable medical practice.139
In any fundamental reform of abortion law, it would be necessary for legislators
to pay close attention to the existence of specific circumstances that would merit
the imposition of a criminal sanction. It was noted above that the majority of
prosecutions under both the OAPA and ILPA have been brought against men
who assault pregnant women in order to provoke miscarriages. Given the harm to
the women involved, such actions should continue to be chargeable and would be
so under general offences relating to the causing of actual and grievous bodily
harm. It would be necessary, however, to consider whether any amendment to
135 The analogy with dentistry also illustrates, however, that what might well provoke a growth in attempts to
secure treatment outside of mainstream health services would be the removal of NHS funding: S Armstrong and
M Ruiz del Arbol, ‘The Rise of DIY Dentistry’ Guardian (3 April 2015) <www.theguardian.com/society/2015/
apr/03/rise-of-diy-dentistry-britons-doing-own-fillings-to-avoid-nhs-bill> (accessed 11 August 2015).
136 R v Brown [1994] 1 AC 212 (HL); Attorney General’s Ref (No 6 1980) [1981] QB 715 (CA).
137 s 39, Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 47 and s 20 OAPA, respectively. Reformers might also consider the
alternative solution foreseen in Victoria: an amendment to the Crimes Act 1958 creating a specific criminal
offence of performing an abortion while not a qualified person, with the woman who undergoes the abortion
remaining excluded from prosecution, s 65.
138 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582 (QB); R v Adomako [1995] 1 AC 171
(HL). The potential application of general legal provisions has been recently illustrated in the announcement that
a doctor and two nurses are to be prosecuted after a patient bled to death following an abortion. They have been
charged with gross negligence manslaughter and failing to take reasonable care of those affected by omissions at
work, contrary to the Health and Safety Act 1974. See BBC, ‘Doctor and Nurses in Abortion Clinic Death
Manslaughter Charges’ BBC News (5 June 2015) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-33032213>
(accessed 11 August 2015).
139 eg CPS, ‘CPS Statement on Abortion Related Case’ (5 September 2013) <www.cps.gov.uk/news/latest_
news/cps_statement_abortion_related_case/> (accessed 11 August 2015). However, see also Keown (n 21) 136,
questioning the GMC’s ability to exercise this supervisory function effectively.











the scope of these offences is required to ensure that the extent of harm caused to
a woman by the loss of a desired pregnancy is fully recognised in law.140 Close
attention should also be paid to the small group of cases where men have been
prosecuted for attempts to procure the miscarriage of pregnancies that were
wanted by the women concerned, through administering abortion drugs to them
without their knowledge.141 While such conduct might fall within existing
criminal prohibitions on the administration of ‘a poison or other destructive or
noxious thing’,142 again it would be necessary to clarify that the scope of this
offence covers these factual circumstances and that the available sentence
captures the full harm caused by the loss of a desired pregnancy.
Finally, within the process of reform, it would also be necessary to consider
whether it would be valuable to retain some aspects of the AA. While I have no
space to expand here, in my view, it would be appropriate to maintain a right
of conscientious objection for healthcare professionals who choose to opt out of
participating in abortion procedures. Notification requirements might also
continue to perform a useful role, not least in allowing for the rigorous testing
of the claim made above: that decriminalisation would be likely to have little
impact on the incidence of legal abortion.
B. Two Hard Cases
There are, however, two cases where decriminalisation would make a
significant difference to legal access to abortion, potentially impacting on
abortion rates. Further, to the extent that my argument is grounded in
permissive public opinion regarding abortion, these are also cases that would
require particularly close attention in any reform process.
First, it is impossible to know what impact there would be on the incidence
of abortion if decriminalisation were also to extend to Northern Ireland, as
there is no reliable means of estimating current numbers of terminations each
year. Beyond the few dozen women who terminate pregnancies within the
jurisdiction and the several hundred who give addresses in Northern Ireland
when accessing services in Britain each year, there are undoubtedly many more
who access legal services without using their real addresses and others who
procure illegal abortions.143 However, while decriminalisation would have an
140 The VLRC (n 132) para 7.95 recommended that decriminalisation of abortion should be accompanied by
statutory amendment to clarify that the destruction of a fetus caused by assault of a pregnant woman would fall
within the definition of ‘serious injury’ to her.
141 As in Magira and Erin (n 31).
142 s 23 OAPA prohibits ‘maliciously administering poison, & c. so as to endanger life or inflict grievous
bodily harm’ and carries a maximum ten-year prison sentence; s 24 prohibits the lesser offence of ‘maliciously
administering poison, & c. with intent to injure, aggrieve or annoy any other person’. In Smeaton (n 1) [271],
Munby J implicitly accepts that abortifacients might fall within the ambit of these offences.
143 There were 51 lawful abortions performed within NI Health and Social Care Services in 2012/13, see
McClelland and Kennedy (n 44); a further unknown but almost certainly very small number were carried out by
the Marie Stopes clinic in Belfast; and 837 women giving addresses in Northern Ireland terminated pregnancies
in England and Wales in 2014, see Department of Health, ‘Abortion Statistics’ (n 47).











unknown impact on the absolute incidence of abortion among women in
Northern Ireland, it would nonetheless have the very significant effect of
opening the door to far greater provision of legal services within the
jurisdiction. While assessing the legal and political fallout of such a move is
beyond the scope of this paper, it is certain to be significant. While some data
exists to suggest that public opinion in Northern Ireland would favour modest
moves towards a less restrictive law,144 and steps are underway to assess the
merits of some very limited legal changes,145 Northern Ireland MPs have
consistently raised vocal opposition to liberalising reform.146 However, if, faced
with decriminalisation, the Northern Ireland Assembly chose to make use of its
powers to regulate on abortion that would at least mean that women in
Northern Ireland would gain a law that is the product of a modern, local,
democratic debate. Moves towards decriminalisation might also provoke the
kind of public consultation on the reform of the law in Northern Ireland that
has been repeatedly demanded by CEDAW.147
Second, removal of the specific criminal prohibitions regarding unlawful
procurement of miscarriage in the OAPA, child destruction in the ILPA and
corresponding offences in Scots common law, would have the effect also of
decriminalising post-viability abortions. It should be acknowledged that later
terminations raise particularly acute moral concerns for many and that the
retention of criminal law restrictions would be likely to command more popular
support in this context.148 While this issue would thus require particularly close
deliberation, such consideration should take seriously the question of what is to
be gained by criminalising women at any stage of gestation and, further, the
importance of removing barriers that discourage women from accessing
professional advice and support. The difficulty and risks involved in later
procedures also offer some reason to suppose that the removal of criminal
penalties would not lead to a dramatic escalation in later terminations. In
addressing this issue, Victoria chose to take women and healthcare profes-
sionals out of the criminal law altogether, while retaining criminal penalties
against professionally unqualified abortionists at all gestations, and foreseeing
the threat of professional sanctions as an appropriate way of building in
144 Polling data suggests a consistent majority in favour of permitting abortion in cases of rape, incest or fetal
anomaly: Family Planning Association of Northern Ireland, ‘NI Women’s European Platform and Alliance for
Choice’, Submission of Evidence to the CDEAW Committee: Optional Protocol Inquiry Procedure (FPANI
2010) 59–61.
145 The NI Department of Justice recently held a consultation on whether abortion should be permitted in
Northern Ireland in the case of fatal fetal abnormality and where a pregnancy results from a sexual offence,
Department of Justice, ‘Consultation on Abortion’ (2014) <www.dojni.gov.uk/consultation-on-abortion-2014>
(accessed 11 August 2015).
146 For an excellent overview of political developments, see Whitaker and Horgan (n 105).
147 CEDAW (n 78).
148 A YouGov poll for the Sunday Times canvassed views from 1761 British adults in January 2012. When
asked ‘Currently, the legal time limit for abortion is 24 weeks. Leaving aside medical emergencies, which of these
options do you favour?’, only 5 per cent favoured increasing the time limit, as compared to 34 per cent who
favoured retaining a 24 week limit, 37 per cent who favoured reducing the time limit, 6 per cent who favoured
banning abortion altogether, and 17 per cent who did not know. YouGov (n 100).











safeguards against healthcare professionals who act outside of recognised
practice around access to later terminations.149 While there is no hard data on
this point, this appears not to have resulted in increased numbers of later
terminations in Victoria, as healthcare professionals have set their own limits
on services.150 If notification requirements were retained in the UK, the better
data thus available would, of course, allow for this aspect of reform to be
monitored closely.
5. Conclusion
The fact that a statute is old is not a problem in and of itself. However, any law
fossilises the values and assumptions of the era in which it was introduced and
the statutory framework regulating abortion is embedded within particularly
deep historical strata. The OAPA provides a fascinating snapshot of the
anxieties and realities of Victorian Britain, entrenching a motley collection of
specific offences, including those of impeding a person endeavouring to save
himself from shipwreck,151 failure to provide ‘apprentices or servants with
food, &c. whereby life is endangered’152 and ‘assaults with intent to obstruct
the sale of grain, or its free passage’.153 It is no surprise that legislation
grounded in those concerns appears anachronistic to modern eyes.154 While
they raise additional ‘broad policy considerations’, the offences relating to
abortion suffer just as seriously from this problem as do those other parts of
the Act that the Law Commission has identified as requiring reform.
In general, the danger of such legal ‘fossilisation’ is guarded against by a
range of strategies. First, any statute is subject to interpretation by those who
apply it day to day: here, service providers and doctors. This interpretation has
evolved over time, in the obiter opinion of one judge, leading to a situation
where the law is now ‘wrongly, liberally construed in practice so as to make
abortion available essentially on demand prior to 24 weeks with the approval of
registered medical practitioners’.155 Yet while this may reflect the judge’s own
moral or religious view, with respect, there is no basis for describing a liberal
construal of the AA as ‘wrongful’ in legal terms. On the contrary, the Act is
149 s 5 Abortion Law Reform Act (Vic) 2008.
150 Anecdotal evidence suggests that there have, if anything, been fewer post-viability terminations since the
reform was introduced, with the one provider that had previously offered later abortions subsequently
discontinuing that part of the service (for reasons unconnected with the change in law) and no privately
practising doctor in Victoria currently offering terminations beyond 24 weeks. Personal communications:
Professor Angela Taft, Professor and Director Judith Lumley Centre (formerly Mother and Child Health
Research), La Trobe University; Jenny Ejlak, Co-President, Reproductive Choice, Australia.
151 s 17 OAPA.
152 s 26 OAPA.
153 s 39 OAPA.
154 The Law Commission notes that the OAPA ‘is widely recognised as being outdated’. <www.lawcom.gov.
uk/project/offences-against-the-person> (accessed 11 August 2015).
155 Catt (n 122) [15].











‘built on the premise of non-interference with clinical freedom’:156 in 1967
Parliament fully intended that the ‘great social responsibility’ for regulating
access to abortion should be placed on the shoulders of doctors.157 In
exercising this responsibility and using their discretion liberally, doctors have
done no more than to develop abortion services in line with evolutions in
broader popular morality and best medical practice, interpreting the law in a
way that is fully supported by concerns for women’s reproductive health and
patient autonomy. Further, this interpretation is one that respects the original
purpose of the Act: to ensure that ‘socially acceptable abortions should be
carried out under the safest conditions attainable.’158
Second, laws are subject to interpretation by the judiciary, who are tasked to
read them as ‘constantly speaking’ ‘living statutes’, with considerable judicial
creativity sometimes deployed to limit the extent to which our aged statutory
framework impedes the modern provision of high quality services.159 There
are, however, limits to the elasticity of legal language. The judge’s primary duty
is to give effect to the ordinary (or, where appropriate, technical) meaning of
words, yet this task becomes difficult when legislation needs to be applied in
the context of medical realities unimaginable to its architects.160 This is most
graphically illustrated by the challenge of applying laws developed during an
era of now rarely used surgical techniques in the context of a widespread
reliance on medical abortion.161
Where the gulf between the plain language of a statute and a sensible
interpretation of it becomes too great, a third strategy becomes necessary: for
lawmakers to step in to remove or revise offending provisions. Here, the Law
Commission plays an important role, aiming ‘to ensure that the law is fair,
modern, simple [and] effective’.162 Yet this work is blocked where issues are
perceived as raising policy considerations that render them unsuitable to be
considered by a law reform body and, a fortiori, if they are perceived as too
controversial to be tackled by government. Abortion is, perhaps, the paradig-
matic example of this problem, with the Commission’s exclusion of offences
relating to abortion from the scope of its current consultation providing only
the most recent example of a longstanding official reluctance to put abortion
law reform before Parliament. Many domestic abortion laws (including the
AA) were introduced by way of private members’ bills, often denying them the
benefit of the skilled drafting that would be provided by parliamentary
draftspersons.163 Many reforms (again, including revisions to the AA) have
156 Keown (n 21) 137.
157 Smith (n 33) 381 Scarman LJ.
158 This is how the purpose of the legislation was summarised by the House of Lords in RCN (n 83) 575.
159 See eg, Smeaton (n 1), and RCN ibid.
160 See Munby J’s recognition of this difficulty, Smeaton ibid [334].
161 See eg RCN (n 83); and BPAS v Secretary of State for Health [2011] EWHC 235 (Admin), [2012] 1 WLR 580.
162 See http://lawcommission.justice.gov.uk/ (accessed 11 August 2015).
163 The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Bill (1966), which was to become the AA, was introduced by the
Liberal MP, David Steel.











taken the form of amendments tagged onto the vehicle of other statutes, of
necessity thus offering a tinkering at the edges of existing statutory frameworks
rather than providing the coherent, root and branch measures that might be
envisaged in a specific reform bill. The costs of such political expediency are
felt in the form of uncorrected poor drafting, archaic terminology that
fits uneasily with modern reproductive healthcare practice, and—most
fundamentally—underpinning values and assumptions that remain grounded
in the moral mores and medical practices of a long distant era.
Writing some 30 years ago, the veteran pro-choice campaigner, Madeleine
Simms, argued that ‘the 1967 Abortion Act was a half-way house. It handed
the abortion decision to the medical profession. The next stage is to hand this
very personal decision to the woman herself.’164 In practice, this second step
has already been taken: doctors have used the broad discretion accorded to
them under the AA to respect patient autonomy in this as in other contexts.
What remains is to update the law to bring it into line with modern medical
practice, leaving abortion services subject to the same complex web of
regulation that governs other aspects of healthcare provision. Such a change
would not remove social contestation around abortion. It would, however,
recognise that a law is overdue reform when there is no appetite for enforcing it
in the context for which it was intended, where it has no impact on abortion
rates, where it imposes clinically unnecessary impediments that restrict the
provision of a high quality, safe and compassionate service, and where it
stigmatises one third of British women and the healthcare professionals who
care for them. In 2018, we will mark not just the fiftieth anniversary of the
coming into effect of the Abortion Act 1967 but also the one hundredth
anniversary of the first British women achieving the right to vote.165 It would
be a fitting commemoration of each of these anniversaries were the MPs, who
as women we are now formally empowered to share in electing, to recognise
our formal legal right to control our own fertility.
164 M Simms, ‘Legal Abortion in Great Britain’ in H Homans (ed), The Sexual Politics of Reproduction (Gower
1985) 94.
165 The Abortion Act came into effect on 27 April 1968. For the relevant electoral reform laws, see n 2.
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